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Somalia: Rough Road to Peace (2)


A recent International Crisis Group (ICG) report on al-Shabaab describes the Ethiopian invasion as the event that turned the loosely organised Islamic courts coalition into a much more centralised and extremist organisation.[8] Of course, the power of al-Shabaab is not unchallenged in Somalia. The ICG report offers a blueprint of ways to de-legitimise the hard-line insurgent organisation. Al-Shabaab is not the sum total of Somalia's religious community; there are factions within the broader Islamist movement amenable to a political settlement with the transitional government and other organisations which have arrayed in opposition to al-Shabaab's fundamentalism. Suicide bombs in Mogadishu, harsh social prescriptions and the destruction of Sufi holy places and shrines have rallied popular disapproval of al-Shabaab. More than anything else, the Somali people are weary of the chaos of war; al-Qaeda-style ideas of permanent military jihad do not retain much lustre to a people who have already contended with the ramifications of permanent warfare.

In this context, the Kampala bombings must be seen as what they are, a baiting of the bear. By bringing the Somalian fight to the international community so crudely, al-Shabaab is counting on an aggressive international response. More civilian deaths at the hands of AMISOM soldiers will close off the renewed possibilities for moderate leadership to seize the reins from al-Shabaab and discredit the transitional government. Similarly, the rampant anti-Islamic rhetoric of the US war on terror will alienate the moderate elements of Somalia's Islamist movements. Once bombs begin falling in earnest and fighting intensifies, the Somalian struggle will once again align with the script that poses national patriots against foreign aggressors, and the al-Shabaab will have already won the ideological struggle for the Somali people's support.

In its March 2010 report, the ICG's policy recommendations focus on the need for the transitional government to make inroads with Somali people by collaborating with moderate elements in the Islamist movement. It calls for new attempts at outreach and coalition-building. Unfortunately, the transitional government remains unable or unwilling to do this work. Plagued by corruption and ineffective diplomacy, the transitional government as recently as March 2010 was requesting more international support and funding to hold its ground against al-Shabaab. In fact, international support is the very last thing that would lead to the government's success. At the centre of al-Shabaab's critique of the TFG is the claim that it functions as a Western puppet government. If the TFG has not been able to convert considerable international support into effective governing institutions in the past six years, it is naïve to suppose that pumping more resources into the government's hands would provide a better result. At this point, the federal government must win the support of the Somalian population on its own terms. If it remains unable to do so, alternative local leadership with greater local support and vision will rise up and fill the void.

The United States and the African Union must leave off nation-building in Somalia. Effective solutions to the Somalian civil war will not be cooked up in Kampala, Washington DC or Addis Ababa. One of the key lessons of Somaliland's experience is that effective government must come from within. In the words of the former Somaliland president Dahir Rayale Kahin, 'you can't be donated power... We built this state because we saw the problems here as our problems. Our brothers in the South are still waiting--till now--for others.'[9]

Somaliland's national cohesion has been bought at a high price. This territory suffered particularly under the Barre regime. Somaliland is knit together by its history and years of brutal violence and resistance. In 1991, following the demise of Barre, the territory declared itself independent. Although Somaliland's independence is not widely recognised because of African Union protections of the colonial era's state boundaries, the Somaliland community has struggled to independently build a national community.

Somaliland successfully demobilised the militia that existed during the Barre region and found a way to absorb these young men into a stable society. It has held multiple national elections, created a constitution and has built a modest economy, supplemented by members of the Somaliland diaspora living abroad. Most importantly, Somaliland has secured a treasured peace on its own terms and by its own efforts. In the past 20 years Somaliland's struggle has been for world recognition. Yet, ironically, it is precisely the country's isolation from the international community that has allowed it to develop home-grown peace and stability. Without the dubious direction of international experts and unable to rely on international economic assistance, Somaliland has reconstructed itself with self-reliance, accountability and local investment as its touchstones.

It would be naïve to expect Somalia to simply recreate the history of Somaliland, but it may be time for those who care about peace in Somalia to study the lessons of the Somaliland experiment. Adding more AMISOM soldiers is not the recipe for peace in a country which has recently dealt with foreign invasion. Somalia's most pressing struggle is to develop a leadership that is supported by the local population and which has the country's peace and stability at heart. This will not be an al-Qaeda-linked terrorist organisation, but it will also not be a weak 'federal' government that can only stand because of the international community's support.

Rather than dismissing Somaliland as a threat to national integrity and sovereignty, the African Union would do well to support and study Somaliland as a country which offers a unique blueprint of home-grown development and provides an important image of peace in the Horn of Africa.

NOTES

[1] http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2010/07/2010711212520826984.html

[2] http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Al|0Shabaab|0bombs|0Kampala|0it|0must|0now|0expect|0a|0tireless|0enemy/-/440808/957988/-/bdhmws/-

[3] http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/Kenyanews/Kenya-tells-Al-Shabab-to-keep-off-9077.html

[4] http://www.afrol.com/articles/36498

[5] Said S. Samatar, 'The Islamic Courts and Ethiopia's Intervention in Somalia: Redemption or Adventurism?' April 25, 2007. http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/9592_250407samatar.pdf

'Even as we speak, Ethiopia's flag is flying--- nay, undulating beatifically in the red, green, golden stripes and all--over Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, and this at the invitation of Somalia's Transitional Federal Government. This is surely an ironic development, in view of the fact, that for ages, Ethiopia stood, in the eyes of the Somalis as the putative foe of the Somalis.'

[6] http://www.somalilandpatriots.com/print-2935-0

[7] Ibid.

[8] 'Somalia's Divided Islamists,' Africa Policy Briefing No. 71, International Crisis Group, May 18, 2010.

[9] Jeffry Gettleman, 'Somaliland is an overlooked African success story,' The New York Time, March 6, 2007


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