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Remaking the Somali state: a renewed building-block approach
Posted on October 18, 2010 at 10:45:21 PM by mb4

Remaking the Somali state: a renewed building-block approach

Morten Bøås and Narve Rotwitt
September 2010

Full-text report

Morten Bøås is Research Director and Senior Researcher at Fafo’s Institute for Applied International Studies. He has written extensively about African politics and conflict, and global development issues. Bøås’s work has been published in journals such as Third World Quarterly, Journal of Modern African Studies, Politique Africaine, and Global Governance. His most recently published books include African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine (Lynne Reiner, 2007, co-edited with Kevin Dunn) and International Development Vol. I-IV (Sage, 2010, co-edited with Benedicte Bull).

Narve Rotwitt earned a master degree in political science from the University of Oslo, based on a thesis on Somalia and the Islamic Courts Union. After submitting his thesis in January 2010 he worked as a Research Assistant at Fafo until July 2010. During this period he co-authored two Fafo reports, on Somalia and on the use of surveys in conflict research. He is currently working at the Norwegian embassy in Asmara, Eritrea.

Executive summary

The record of externally sponsored statebuilding initiatives in Somalia since 1991 is one of failure. Most of these initiatives have sought to restore a unitary state, an effort that has been unsuccessful and will not happen in the immediate future. This report calls for a different way forward – a return to a “building-block” approach to statebuilding, guided by a pragmatic outlook that transfers power to local authorities and civil society. This is not a new idea, for it has been discussed ever since the end of colonial rule in Somalia. The two-stage idea is to break up the territory into smaller pieces – “building-blocks” – that can more effectively be managed by local authorities; then, when these become working polities, reunite them under a decentralised, federal or even confederal structure.

The example of Somaliland (and to a different degree Puntland) gives credibility to such an approach. Somaliland is without doubt the most peaceful and stable part of the country. By adopting a system of governance anchored in the clan-based principles of the predominantly nomadic northern Somali society, in combination with liberal democratic values, it has been able to provide security to its citizens as well as collecting a modest level of taxes. The trajectory that led to Somaliland’s current system of governance cannot necessarily be transplanted automatically to the rest of the country, but this experience of local reconciliation and statebuilding should be given much more attention; in particular, it shows that statebuilding efforts crucially need to be domestically driven and to engage the broader public.

This “indigenising” of the statebuilding process both gives legitimacy to local leaders and makes it easier for the population to hold them accountable. The way that parts of Somalia are consolidating their regional polities suggests that a revival of the building-block
approach is the best route to finding a lasting solution to the Somali problem.

Introduction.

Somalia has become the graveyard of externally sponsored statebuilding initiatives. It is not just that more than fourteen attempts to restore a unitary state have failed miserably, but that these efforts have been followed by more rather than less war in the country. This track record should in itself encourage international stakeholders to rethink their current statebuilding approaches to Somalia. Events in Somalia itself also lend support to such rethinking. Somaliland is the clearest illustration of this, and Puntland confirms it: both areas have established relatively stable systems
of local governance.

This report draws on the lessons of this experience to propose a building-block approach to statebuilding as the most promising formula for remaking a viable Somali state. In essence, such a formula contains a power-sharing arrangement between a lean central government (concerned with certain specific core tasks) and strong autonomous regional governments (which perform most ordinary governmental tasks, including provision of local security).

This is not a new idea or a novel strategy; indeed, it has been part of a broader debate about the respective merits of centralised and decentralised governance that has been going on since the end of colonialism in Somalia in 1960. In sum, the idea is twofold: to divide the country into smaller pieces or “building-blocks”, that effectively can be managed by local authorities; then, when these have become working polities, reunite them under a decentralised, federal or even confederal structure.

This proposal reflects the reality that Somalia is a clan-based society that is currently made up of three distinct regions. Most Somalis claim to be members of a clan – each of which is divided into sub-clans, themselves in turn divided into smaller sub-sub groups, down to the level of the core family unit. The clan forms the basis for most of the key social institutions and norms of traditional Somali society – including personal identity, rights of access to local resources, customary law (xeer), blood-payment (diya) groups, and support-systems. There is some disagreement about the exact detailed structures of these extended-family groupings, but in general they can be divided into six major clans that comprise the vast majority of the country’s population: the Darod, Isaak, Dir, Hawiye, Digil and Rahanweyn (as well as a nominal seventh clan of minority Arab and Bantu groups).

These clan realities intersect with regional ones. In northern Somalia, two state-like entities – Somaliland and Puntland – have emerged; whereas in the south, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is struggling to stay in power in the face of armed opposition from Islamist insurgents. At the same time, suspicion towards and even outward rejection of the idea of a centralised unitary state is growing stronger. All this, plus the lessons of past attempts to build a centralised state, should make it clear that there is but one route to a properly endorsed peace and national reconciliation: through a formula that recognises the regional building-blocks of a new Somali state – and which also includes clan leaders and civil society (though not only these groups).

The statebuilding debate: unitary v federal

The longstanding debate about a unitary or federal state as the solution to the Somali debacle is exacerbated by the fact that Somalis tend to belong to deeply divided centralist and federalist camps. In general, the position Somalis adopt depends on how they perceive their own clan’s strength and options. Those belonging to weaker groups (such as the Digil-Mirifle) are often forceful advocates of regional autonomy, as they see this structure as a protective shield against their stronger counterparts; by contrast, members of larger and strong clans (such as the Hawiye) tend to perceive federalism as an attempt to erode the political and economic power that they have come to see as rightfully theirs.

The advocates of decentralisation argue that local administrations tend to be more representative and hence more legitimate. They often cite the case of Somaliland, where elders from different clans have been able through a series of meetings and negotiations to come together and establish a relatively legitimate and representative form of governance. The very limits of the region (in terms of size and the number of parties involved) also reduced the stakes and eased the reconciliation process.

The argument for decentralisation also makes the point that local administrations tend to be more efficient and capable of responding to local needs. This too makes them better at generating revenues. Considerations of proximity and legitimacy mean that the income from taxes that can be secured in Somalia is likely to be larger at the regional rather than at the national level. In sum, federalists argue that regional power-structures are better equipped to defuse political tensions, and that working through them is consequently a better route to national reconciliation and the re-establishment of the Somali state.

But the critics of this decentralisation approach caution that it can have serious drawbacks and unintended consequences. The greatest fear is that it will permanently divide Somalia into ever smaller units. Somaliland’s aspiration to full secession supports this argument. The Somaliland polity has, from the time of its declaration of independence in 1991, matured and become a semi-functional democracy. As its sovereign attributes have been consolidated, so its claims to full separation from Somalia have increased.

The idea of abandoning growing local stability in favour of all the uncertainties connected to reuniting under the banner of a centralised, unitary Somali state may be difficult to sell in Somaliland. Few Somalilanders are willing to reunite with a violent unstable south, and thereby incur the risk of again being neglected and exploited by southern power-seeking clans and factions. But this very sentiment is, for the supporters of centralisation, proof that federalisation promotes secessionism and institutionalises fragmentation. A further common anti-federal argument is that local and smaller administrations are more vulnerable to the monopolisation of power by unrepresentative faction leaders. This notion gained credence when, after Siad Barre’s fall in 1991, various warring factions and militia groups arose to fight for control over assets and territories, both rural and urban. The main difference of opinion between these two positions seems to be that while the federalists see the risks of restoring a unitary centralised state as too high, the supporters of a unitary centralised approach fear that a Somalia of ever smaller fragments may lead to the country’s permanent division.

Strategies for peace and statebuilding

The clear traces of this debate can be found in the many peace and reconciliation conferences held in the post-Siad Barre years. The first meetings in the 1990s – in which the participants were mainly faction leaders and warlords – leaned towards the centralised approach and focused on finding a solution for the whole of Somalia. In effect, these meetings turned into almost permanent power-struggles over political influence and status: at each successive one, the number of factions taking part increased; the majority of the agreements they reached were never implemented or respected; and no lasting settlement was ever achieved. Instead this approach contributed to making the factions the centrepiece of “national reconciliation”, while other and potentially more peaceful actors were ignored. The third Addis Ababa conference in March 1993 was different in this respect, in that it concluded by drawing a federal framework that also involved traditional leaders and former politicians. It proposed combining a central government with directly elected district councils and eighteen regional councils, the latter constituting the lowest level of a new Transitional National Council.

Some of these regional administrations were actually established, and functioned quite well for some time. However, as the United Nations started to appoint officials the system became more and more centralised; this caused unease within parts of Somali civil society, which found itself increasingly ignored and deprived of most of its influence. In essence, key national positions were again reserved for the warlords. Hence, what started out as a promising endeavour towards reconciliation turned into yet another power-struggle between warlords and faction leaders.

The disengagement from Somalia of western governments after the failed interventions of the early 1990s opened up space for another federal initiative. Following the termination of the UN operation, a number of regional and trans-regional authorities emerged. These regions were initially depicted as future regional states in what was called a “building-block” approach to national reconciliation, set in motion by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)1. The idea was that local administrative structures, run by civil society, were to constitute building-blocks in the restoration of peace and statehood. By creating zones of peace and stability locally, these would eventually be achieved nationally.

Replies:

Analysis: Missed opportunities in Somalia - By mb4 October 18, 2010 at 10:41:38 PM

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